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Three Challenges for Professor Nolon
A. DAN TARLOCK*
John Nolon is a brave academic. In a dark time in the United
States generally, and for environmental protection and natural re-
sources management specifically,' he has dared to dream an alter-
native vision of the status quo. Not only has he dared to dream an
alternative, he has worked to implement it on the ground, in the
Hudson River Valley and elsewhere, and to generalize the experi-
ence to express optimism about the wider significance of these ef-
forts. His recent effort to do this, Champions of Change:
Reinventing Democracy Through Land Law Reform,2 envisions a
built landscape which is better adapted to mitigating the damages
from a wide range of natural disasters, is more sustainable, and
strikes a better balance between protection of sensitive lands and
productive ecosystems than the current pattern of ever-expanding
urban boundaries. He has set a formidable challenge for himself.
We are well into the fourth decade of environmental regula-
tion, but compared to the progress that we have made in air and
water pollution, we continue to use and abuse land in an unsus-
tainable manner. No comparable regulatory regime has devel-
oped. Some fragmented federal and state regulation has emerged,
but this regulation is, on the whole, weakening rather than
strengthening, as well as calcifying.3 Consequently, the burden of
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. A.B. 1962, LL.B. 1965, Stan-
ford University.
1. An assessment of the Bush II Administration's environmental record by the
leading conservative environmental law thinker, Professor Barton Thompson of Stan-
ford University, concludes that where the Administration has pursued environmental
objectives, the reforms principally "reduce the regulated community's costs of achiev-
ing various environmental goals or devolve responsibility to states in contexts where
the regulated community might be more amendable to state regulation." Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., Conservative Environmental Thought: The Bush Administration and
Environmental Policy, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 347 (2005).
2. Champions of Change was originally published in the Harvard Environmen-
tal Law Review. See 30 HARv. ENvTL. L. REV. 1 (2006). The article is reprinted here at
page 905 with the permission of the editors of the Harvard Environmental Law
Review.
3. Oregon's is the model of a progressive land use regulatory scheme, but in 2004
Oregon voters adopted Ballot Measure 37. The measure gives land owners a variety of
remedies against land use regulations that lessen the fair market value of their prop-
1
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regulating land falls on local governments. Historically, this has
been seen as an unfortunate byproduct of our federal system be-
cause local governments often lack the will to do more than to set
minimal rules for the accommodation of land development and
lack the legal competence to address environmental problems at
the appropriate geographic scale.
While acutely aware of these problems, Professor Nolon dis-
sents from this pessimistic view and finds that "[vliewed as an
organic whole, these local laws and practices demonstrate remark-
able adaptation to contemporary needs and challenges."4 The
"these" refers to the adoption of hundreds of local land use laws
designed to protect natural resources and to abate nonpoint
source pollution, the increasing incident of mediated large-scale
development plans, and increased technical assistance for local
governments in many areas. Efforts like these are further com-
plemented in many areas with the efforts of NGOs to put new is-
sues, such as the relationship between water supply and urban
development, on the planning and political agenda. Together,
these responses can be used by local governments to creatively
and democratically adapt to a complex, fragmented, and increas-
ingly environmentally conscious land use ethic. One can also de-
velop a new regulatory paradigm from these efforts. Scholars such
as Jody Freeman argue that in the post-modern (post New Deal)
state, the best hope for addressing problems lies with modular
regulation. 5 Modular regulation is essentially the substitution of
compliance with uniform mandates with ad hoc processes that ad-
dress a specific problem. 6
It is too early to pass judgment on the significance of the ef-
forts, and other similar ones, that Professor Nolon has
spearheaded. In this commentary, I temper my skepticism by
casting it in the form of some challenges for Professor Nolon and
others working in today's political and legal environment. I iden-
erty. See MacPherson v. Dep't of Admin. Servs., 340 Or. 117, 121 (2006). The Oregon
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the measure against the argument
that the measure denied Oregon citizens the benefits of rational legislative regula-
tion. Id. at 126-28, 141.
4. John R. Nolon, Champions of Change: Reinventing Democracy Through Land
Law Reform, 30 HARv. ENVTL. L REV. 1, 9 (2006).
5. See Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation,
54 DuKE L.J. 795 (2005). Professors Freeman and Farber use the example of the Bay-
Delta Process, an ambitious effort to balance water consumption with the preserva-
tion of the San Francisco Bay Delta. Id. at 836-76.
6. See Id. at 798.
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tify three primary, nonexclusive ones: the moral hazard problem,
the function of zoning, and the problem of "third best." I look for-
ward to learning how Professor Nolon and his team successfully
address them.
I. THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM
The effort to create a built landscape that is better adapted to
mitigate the damages caused by natural disasters must confront
the fundamental problem that United States land use law creates
too many incentives to assume bad, predictable risks and very few
incentives to avoid the consequences of the risk. Efforts to design
more environmentally sustainable landscapes seek to do no less
than to impose the economic doctrine of moral hazard on public
and private land use decisions. The legal and political challenges
to reverse the incentives to construct a landscape that can adapt
to natural disasters, especially those that may be enhanced by
global climate change, are formidable.
The root of the problem is the economic concept of moral haz-
ard. Economists and students of natural disasters such as Gilbert
White have long argued that it is economically irrational to en-
courage people to locate in the face of danger, such as in flood
plains or vulnerable hurricane zones, and then acquiesce to their
demands to be compensated when damage occurs. However, both
law and a long history of charity toward the victims of fate have
created the expectation that the inefficient assumption of risk will
be rewarded, not penalized. Economists call this the moral hazard
problem. Of course, there are important differences among types
of location choices and disasters. However, with few exceptions,
all levels of government encourage and reward landowners for
moral hazards.
The incentive to assume risks starts with the Fifth Amend-
ment and continues through the well-justified expectation that
the federal government will compensate the victims of a wide
range of natural disasters. In between is the long history of the
construction of flood control projects and a federal flood insurance
program that still encourages building in high risk areas. The
problem is not with the basic idea of helping victims of natural
disasters, but in our inability to distinguish between deserving
victims and subsidized risk takers. In a recent article, Can We
Save New Orleans?," Professor Oliver Houck envisions a future for
7. Oliver Houck, Can We Save New Orleans?, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2006).
2006] 699
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southern Louisiana built to prevent the retardation of natural
water flow and to reduce the human population in high risk areas.
However, as he observes, "it will be nearly insane in a region that
equates planning with socialism and has always looked on the
Corps for a bigger fix."8
The political process is, of course, endlessly open to blunt ef-
forts to create incentives to minimize the damages caused by ex-
treme natural events in advance of their occurrence. 9 However,
the idea that land owners have no responsibility to avoid moral
hazards is built into the constitutional conception of property rec-
ognized in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council1 ° and subse-
quent cases. In Lucas, the Supreme Court held that a complete
elimination of the value of property for development can be a cate-
gorical taking. The Court recognized that there are a limited
number of common background exceptions to title," such as the
duty not to use one's property to cause a nuisance, but it refused to
accept the state's rationale that the regulation prevented the de-
struction of other property during hurricanes. Most of the critical
environmental commentary concerning Lucas has focused on the
Supreme Court's hostility to the idea of environmental regulation
unaccompanied by full compensation. However, the plurality's re-
jection of the state's damage prevention argument illustrates that
the modern idea of property remains rooted in the notion of exclu-
sive dominion subject only to the duty not to cause a nuisance.
This view also lies behind the Court's dismissal of the argument
that the purchaser of highly regulated property assumes the risk
of development denial. The Court quipped, "[tlhe State may not
put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle."'12 Locke
himself might be surprised that his labor theory has now incorpo-
8. Id. at 61.
9. See e.g., Vicki Been, Lucas v. The Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause to
Promote More Efficient Regulation?, in PROPERTY STORIES 221 (Gerald Korngold &
Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2004) (detailing how efforts to protect South Carolina's frag-
ile beaches were rolled back after Lucas contrary to the theory that takings law pro-
motes the adoption of efficient regulatory programs).
10. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
11. See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of
Background Principles As Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARv. ENVrL. L. REV. 321
(2005) (surveying the post-Lucas cases and finding that the background limitation
defense is growing; many examples of the defense involve resources, such as water,
fishing quotas, and public land mining, where the expectation of exclusive dominion
has always been lower than it has for land).
12. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001).
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rated the Roman law right of ius abutendi, the right to destroy
property.
II. THE LIMITED FUNCTION AND POWER OF
ZONING
Land use law is increasingly called upon to perform a broad
range of functions for which it was not originally designed. Land
use controls, especially zoning, are a product of the Progressive
Era. Zoning was born in the major metropolitan areas and re-
flected the untested idea that a well-planned built environment
would make people's lives better. 13 Specifically, zoning was built
on two ideas, both of which are ultimately grounded in the com-
mon law of nuisance: the protection of the single family neighbor-
hood from inferior uses (and people), and the protection of
superior real estate from inferior parasitic uses. Much urban and
suburban zoning still revolves around these issues, although the
underlying progressive rationale has long since vanished. In fact,
the whole idea of the need for rigid use segregation has long been
discredited.
As Professor Nolon has long pointed out, zoning has consider-
able capacity to evolve, and courts have long held that the com-
mon law of nuisance is not the limit of the police power. However,
the fact remains that zoning was never developed as a tool to reg-
ulate non-urban landscapes on a comprehensive scale. Zoning and
subdivision controls have evolved considerably, but cities still are
limited to tinkering with the pace and density of individual devel-
opments and to "taxing" them within the limits of Nollan-Dolan
legal exactions.
The decades-long argument that regulation should be subor-
dinated to planning has borne some fruit, and there are many
large-scale planned communities being built in growing areas;
most regulatory decisions, however, are still relatively small-
scale, individual adjustments. The result can be analogized to fit-
ting the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle together with no expectation that
a clear picture will ever emerge. Put differently, zoning is still
heavily influenced by the common law of nuisance. Regulation
can prevent the undesirable side-effects of certain uses much bet-
13. JOHN D. FAIRFIELD, THE MYSTERIES OF THE GREAT CITY: THE POLITICS OF UR-
BAN DESIGN, 1877-1937 (1993) (demonstrating that zoning represented the partial
triumph of the progressive ideal that expert government intervention is necessary to
temper the operation of the market and that rational, scientifically based planning
and intervention can improve people's lives).
2006]
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ter than it can create a sustainably built urban environment or
conserve a rural one. For example, the current landscape, which is
the product of a long chain of federal, state, and local policies, has
been much criticized. But, continued sprawl is strongly defended
both as the best way to promote low- and moderate-income hous-
ing and as a rational post-9/11 strategy to mitigate the damages
from potential terrorist attacks. 14
III. THE PROBLEM OF "THIRD BEST"
In recent years, there has been a great deal of interest in ad-
dressing land use and resource management problems through ad
hoc, stakeholder, place-driven processes. These processes have
been promoted as alternatives to the rigidities of the strict en-
forcement of command and control regulatory programs, inevita-
bly followed by "rule of law" litigation.15 Professors Jody Freeman
and Daniel Farber have defined these as processes that mix hori-
zontal government coordination with vertical stakeholder partici-
pation as modular regulation. "[Mlodularity requires that
institutional form follow function wherever possible, meaning that
the goal of the modular enterprise is first to diagnose problems
and second to devise solutions and match institutions capable of
implementing them."16 However, the benefits of the substitution
of ad hoc negotiations for more formal planning and regulatory
processes remain an unproven theory.
The search for more flexible ways to address land use conflicts
is a worthy goal, although there are many constraints and serious
accountability problems. For example, entrenched entitlement
holders often have little incentive to change the status quo, seri-
ous power imbalances may be perpetrated by the process, 17 and
the processes are costly and time consuming. The biggest risk is
14. Edward H. Ziegler, American Cities and Sustainable Development in the Age
of Global Terrorism: Some Thoughts on Fortress America and the Potential for Defen-
sive Dispersal 11, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV. 95, 140 (2006).
15. Much of the first generation of environmental law, and to some extent modern
land use law, has been developed through litigation that seeks the strict enforcement
of statutory or constitutional mandates. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environ-
mental "Rule of Law" Litigation, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 575 (2002).
16. Freeman & Farber, supra note 4 at 876.
17. See Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collabora-
tive Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in
Land Use Decisions Installment One, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 36 (2005); Alejandro
Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering
Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions In-
stallment Two, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269, 291-93, 315-16 (2005).
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that these processes will suffer a variant of the economist's "sec-
ond best" problem:18 The new solution may be worse than what
would result from the application of conventional regulation.
Efforts to implement innovative land use solutions at the local
level pose two interrelated substantial risks: sub-optimum scale
and the lack of a vision of a sustainable landscape. First, there is
a mismatch between political boundaries and local jurisdiction.
The result is often either inequitable spillovers or the failure to
achieve the desired objectives. For example, well-planned commu-
nity growth management programs simply push growth outward
into less regulated rural areas. In general, we have failed to cre-
ate institutions to coordinate local land use decisions with serious
inter-regional impacts. Likewise, piecemeal environmental pro-
grams like wetlands conservation and restoration are almost
never done at the necessary watershed level. 19 Second, the
processes are a journey toward an undefined objective in the hope
that the process will yield a legitimate and widely accepted objec-
tive. But the United States has only two visions of the landscapes,
both of which are increasingly problematic.
We have either landscapes fenced off from development under
public land laws, such as the wilderness system, or through public
and private acquisition of open space; or we have tolerated and
encouraged endless low-density development. Landscapes have
traditionally been seen as canvases to be improved upon by
human intervention. In contrast, European planning proceeds
from a much more static, integrated view of the built landscape.
It has proceeded from a vision of a compact and dense city sur-
rounded by a tranquil and well-ordered countryside. As Professor
Guido Martinotti has written, "most European urban thought just
assumes that the countryside is there with the character of the
medieval paintings ... [w]ell-ordered fields like one can see in a
Brueghel painting... stay.., in the back of our consciousness as
some kind of reassuring landmark. '20 The net result is that all
land uses have been seen as transitional stages in an endless pro-
18. Second best theory posits that when all the conditions for an optimum or effi-
cient solution are not met, attempts to solve may result in an even less optimum or
efficient solution. I use the term here as a metaphor for the risks that new means of
conflict resolution to fill the vacuum left by the collapse or calcification of previous
regulatory regimes may pose.
19. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER
THE CLEAN WATER ACT 54 (2001).
20. GUIDO MARTINOTTI, PERCEIVING, CONCEIVING, ACHIEVING: THE SUSTAINABLE
CITY: A SYNTHESIS REPORT 41 (1997).
2006] 703
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cess of dynamic change. 21 Thus, it is difficult to set a target
against which innovation and processes should be measured.
21. My colleague Fred Bosselman has characterized Illinois land use law as the
product of nineteenth-century attitudes which "caused its residents to view land itself
simply as another form of capital that could be made 'abstract, standardized and fun-
gible' through an 'alchemy' of commodification." Fred P. Bosselman, The Commodifi-
cation of "Nature's Metropolis" The Historical Context of Illinois' Unique Zoning
Standards, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 527, 531 (1992).
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